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The United States today has become a liberal credo state. The the American
empire was built at the expense of the American nation. You when things are not
working out for you, don't just blame other people. Look at the kind of
reforms that you could do. If you're building your countries based
on transplanted constitutions, you have no chance of success. I see many
countries among the developing countries in Southeast Asia too are stuck with
political institutions [music] and social institutions and legal
framework that are not the outgrowth of their natural cultural and moral
conditions. I think that's where the fundamental problem is.
If the US were to seriously reestablish strategic stability with Russia,
intuitively Europe would just have to look at China more favorably. Do you see
that as a collective or [music] more individual type of posturing?
Hi friends, it's a pleasure to tell you that my book, What It Takes Southeast
Asia, has been released in English and Bahasa, Indonesia. You can buy it
through books.game.id or at any of these stores. Now, back to
the show. Hi, friends. Today we're honored to be graced by Eric Lee who's a
venture capitalist from China. He's also the chairman of Changi Capital. Eric,
thank you so much. >> Thank you.
>> I, you know, you went to school in the US to pursue your bachelor's and
masters. Then you decided to go back to Shanghai to Fudan, right?
tell us why you chose to go to the US and why you chose to pursue your PhD in
a field that was completely different from your earlier you know scholastic
journey. Um well look I didn't choose to go to the US because there was no
choice. Everybody wanted to go to the US at that time. Um that was the goal of
every young man and woman not only in China but everywhere in the world.
Wouldn't you say so? >> Yep. [laughter] guilty as church because
uh at that time uh we thought everybody thought that the
entire world would just become a giant America.
So if you could have the real thing, why stay where you are if you're not in
America? So everybody the head had a way of making it to
America did that. Uh that's an exaggeration of course I know I'm just
trying to make a point but so I did that >> and then you you you decided to study
political science. >> I studied economics PhD. Well yes PhD.
Yes. So and then I went back to China. Um I've always been interested in
political science. Um but I didn't know how to make money with it. [laughter]
So so I did economics and MBA. Um but then later later in life I I wanted to
to uh um study and read things that that I that really interested me.
>> You you found capital allocation to be the something that's close to your
heart. >> Well, not really. I got into venture
capital uh by accident. >> Yeah.
>> Um I when I was young, I always wanted to be
an entrepreneur, an industrialist. Okay. Uh and then after university um I got a
job uh in a company uh and I discovered I couldn't manage people.
So I I almost gave it up. I said how could you be a businessman if you can't
manage people? Um but I had gotten into business school uh already. So I went
and then I discovered this business called venture capital where you can
feel like you're an entrepreneur but you don't have to manage people. [laughter]
>> So it really suited me. Uh so that's the only job I've ever had for the last my
entire [clears throat] career. >> But you you you still have to manage
people though a few running. Yeah. >> Yeah. Yeah. But do you find that you
find it problematic to get into the portfolio companies that you've been
managing? >> Um, we I want Okay. So, if we're
managing a portfolio company, that means we're in trouble.
>> I see. Good. >> Um, we we wanted to back companies with
um great entrepreneurs, great leaders, right?
>> Uh so that's our role. So you just put the gasoline in the tank and let the
driver take the truck to where it needs to go
>> so to speak. Uh but of course we we try to be helpful. We
>> we add strategic values to the companies uh especially on finance and capital
markets. Uh these days a lot of uh networking uh in science and technology.
Um yeah. Oh >> yeah. The you wrote a book which I
thought was >> really profound.
>> Thank you. >> Uh and and I it resonates to somebody
like me from the global south. Uh the way you've described a number of things.
One of which is the contrast between universalism
and pluralism. Talk about that. Well, um,
we had a period when I was growing up and and we're same generation.
[laughter] Um, where
as you know, uh, after the Cold War, >> right?
>> Um, everybody thought that there was only one way to go uh, in
every aspect of course. Um, so which which was the amazing thing. Uh it's
it's all encompassing and universal. Uh one set of moralities,
one kind of political system, one set of
economic rules, um all of it. Uh and and every country,
every people, every culture, every economy, every region, no matter what
your backgrounds, what your original roots are, you need to adapt to that
universal vision.
Um and we all thought that humanity was moving towards that um inevitably.
Um uh but it turned out the last few decades that this kind of approach had
done much more harm than good to vast number of countries and peoples
including the people in the countries where this idea originated from the US
and and the west. Uh that's why you see these revolts in western countries. Um,
so, so I think we're at a juncture where that universal bubble has bursted.
>> Yeah. >> And
I for one think the future world will be more
interesting because pluralism is fundamentally more interesting than than
a singular way, a singular vision. Um, so I think we're moving towards a more
pluralistic world where people have different values, different religions,
different communities, different economic systems, political
systems. Um, and and hopefully they can coexist. I'm sure there will be
conflicts. Um, but but it's a much more interesting world [snorts] and it's more
conducive uh for especially for countries of the global south to
develop. Um you know post cold war uh what what's interesting is that uh the
vast majority of countries in the global south vast majority um gave up whatever
politics they had before and whatever economic systems they had
before they adopted the western universal outlook and western universal
institutions. Many countries copy their constitutions
from western countries. I mean word for word. [laughter]
They never had these things ever for a thousand years. But oh no, let's
jettison everything we had. Let's install parliament.
Okay. And then let's have these elections. [snorts]
Um and and and let's just do them every four years because the Americans are
doing every four years. Yeah, we're doing it every 5 years.
>> Yeah, you know what I mean. Um, so so vast majority of developing countries
did that. Um, and they all thought when they once they adopted these rules,
once they took these medicines, they will become rich just like western
countries very soon. Um, but they did not. Most of them uh did not succeed. Um
uh many of them were still mired in civil conflicts. Um poverty
um very unsatisfactory. Uh the the one country uh fortunately I'm from that
country, China, uh said no to that. >> Yeah.
>> Okay. >> Amazingly.
>> Yeah. They they said, you know, we're going to adopt some of the stuff but not
the other stuff. We're going to pick and choose. um uh based on our own
circumstances and our own cultural heritage and our own political system
and our own values. Um so we did that and and I I believe I
fortunately belong to the generation that witnessed the great success uh of
that path. Um so I would based on that experience
recommend this to other global south countries and say look the medicine you
took after 1990 didn't work for you. You look as sick as ever
if not sicker and by the by the way the doctor that
prescribed the medicine to you has now fallen ill. Look at them. So try
something different. >> Yeah. Why why do you think it looked a
lot more appealing during the Cold War and it just came crashing down
[clears throat] ever since the end of the Cold War,
right? I mean, one one could argue that the West kind of embarked on this ill
approach to spread liberal values ever since 1991 or early 90s. Why did it look
a lot more appealing before then? Okay, cuz during the cold war, in fact,
the west in order to struggle against the Soviet Union, it was a it was a hard
struggle. Okay? Naked struggle. I mean, just watch James Bond, right? [laughter]
I mean I mean this is no kiss. It was serious serious business.
>> They did not try to spread these things in their own camp. If you look at the
the the western camp uh against the Soviet Union, there were all sorts of
political systems. Yeah. >> There were, you know, so-called
dictatorships, there were religious regimes, there were right, there were
left. It's just across the board. It's it's a
it's a diverse set of countries with a diverse set of regimes and values and
politics. Um but once they sort of won the cold war
they went on a different path. Um but be before the end of the cold war uh
actually the western camp just the western camp itself was pretty diverse.
>> Yeah. The you you've alluded to this as the myocracy
right in terms of the kind of paralysis that resulted
>> the maid movement. Yeah. >> Yeah. the the color revolution and the
Arab Spring, you name it, right? Uh do you see an end to that by way of the
self-paralyzing element that we're seeing in the West
now? >> Well, it's already ended. Um I think um
of the countries that undertook so-called color revolutions or or
regions that undertook color revolutions uh you know you could hardly find one
single example >> that they ended up better off than
before. Uh so this was the most this was the most destructive fraud [laughter]
that was imposed on peoples around the world in the last several decades. It's
it's amazing. Um if I think when historians look back uh they'll see this
period for what it was. Um so it's unfortunate.
>> Yeah. One of your main appeals is that you can say
things that a lot of people in the global south probably would not want to
say, right? And that I think is on the back of the strength of China. And and I
want to put this in the context of the comparison between China and Southeast
Asia. Just in the last 30 something years, China's GDP per capita has gone
up by a factor of 10 times. Southeast Asia is on average 2.7 times.
It's on the back of four or five identifiable attributes in my view.
First is the underinvestment in education.
Second, underinvestment in infrastructure.
Third, [snorts] governance or lack thereof. Fourth is
lack of competitiveness. You issue 10 business licenses on a per
10,000 adult people basis. We in Southeast Asia only one.
>> Yeah. >> And then the fifth is I [laughter] think
a bit paradoxical because you democratize or decentralize economic
activities much better than most democracies around the world.
What's what's the root cause for this? Again, I think every
country, every culture is an organic being is an organic entity.
uh when you transplant something to your country especially
something as fundamental as your political system uh it kills the
patient. [laughter] Okay. So, so I think a large number of
countries in the global south in in Southeast East
Asia too, uh they got they now have it's kind of like, you know, these
countries in the former British Empire, right? [snorts] They have these
artificial borders. They're drawn by some British bureaucrats when they were
rushing out. And these things they're get they get stuck with them and they
never get settled because it's artificially imposed on
them. It's no organic. It's not real. Um so I I see many countries
among the developing countries uh in Southeast Asia too are stuck with
political institutions and social institutions and legal
framework that are not the outgrowth of their natural cultural and moral
conditions. >> Yeah. Um I I think that's where the
fundamental problem is. Um we all know where we want to end up. We want vibrant
economies. We want people live living harmony. We want to achieve advanced
countries living standards. We want to educate our people. But how do we do
that? We need to build roads. >> Yeah.
>> We need all these things. We need we need to build schools.
>> Yeah. We need to raise the number of STEM graduates in our countries.
But to do these things, there's only one route to doing these things. It's called
politics, right? It's how we organize our
societies, how we fundamentally organize our collective activities.
It's called politics. And if your politics is fundamentally
flawed, it's built on transplanted foundations,
these things cannot be carried out effectively.
I mean, not to say that the original thing is going to succeed,
>> right? >> It has problems too.
So, if you stick to your original form without reforms, that's not good either.
Uh but at least you have a chance. >> Yeah. But if you're building your
countries based on transplanted constitutions Yeah.
>> you have no chance of success. >> Yeah. You you referred to the three
stages >> Yeah.
>> of China's Communist Party. The first was
the revolution took place 1949. Then the infusion
then what we're seeing right now is the consolidation. Right.
Are you surprised that the infusion took as little time as it did for China? And
and when I talk about infusion, it it it resonates to me in the context of how
institutional building took place by way of the mandate [snorts]
directive from the party into the various dimensions of the society. Talk
about that. Yeah. Well, look, the revolution was the key.
>> Yeah. Okay. which is what China went through uh at at a heavy price. Of
course, every revolution in history has been um uh uh partially um uh
destructive. Okay. Um you know, a couple years ago, I I I have a media company in
China and I interviewed I I do this um leadership series interviews just by
myself. Um I interviewed President Lula of Brazil.
Um and I asked a very simple question like you asked me today. I said look
President Lula um at the end of the cold war we all had great hopes of all the
developing countries that there's now a playbook to success. All right. There's
now a a winner strategy. You know like these books you know how to get rich
books. We we got a really good one. [laughter]
It's called the US Constitution. Um so so so so we all had great hope that if
we adopted liberal politics,
capitalist economics uh and and and just follow the examples
of America and western countries, we will very soon become prosperous and
rich. But how come so many countries that did
that, Brazil included, in fact, if you look at all the BRICS
countries and China was the only one that really succeeded and the rest were
kind of just, you know, got a little stuck one way or another. How come?
And I was really surprised. President Lula answered me so fast and so
emphatically uh in Portuguese, but I could I could
see he was speaking emphatically and fast. And then I read the transcript.
Well, I got simultaneous translation. He said, "I'll tell you exactly why.
Because you had a revolution." Wow.
We didn't. You had a revolution and the revolution gave you the political
institutions and the DNA that allowed you to chart your own
course. We're stuck with the DNA and the
institutions that were imposed on us and we're still stuck with them.
you know the special interests that the all the so-called checks and balances
the checks and balances are are there to protect special interests okay you know
every when when I was growing up I I go to America I study politics and and and
you know they they talk about check and balance as if it's the panacea I mean
it's it's just BS okay there the check and balances are
there to check their own peoples So,
so there there you go. Uh, so we had a revolution and and and again revolutions
are dangerous. Revolutions are risky, >> right?
>> Uh, it could turn bad, >> but we were lucky. We had a revolution.
We survived the revolution. So would you argue that on the basis that you had
your revolution completed in 1949
despite the fact that you went through difficulties during the great leap
cultural revolution and the fact that you chose to
geopolitically collaborate with Nixon that was actually
a reflection of the infusion that already started happening. Is that the
right right way of thinking? >> Yeah. Well, I mean, I think the
revolution uh succeeded in establishing the people's republic in 1949,
>> right? >> But of course, it had momentum. It
continued on for another decade or two >> uh through the cultural revolution
actually. So, it was a was kind of a revolution and then and then pseudo
revolutionary phase after that. Um these we talk about you but history is so long
so big. >> Yeah.
>> Um a decade, two decades, half a century. If you really look back these
things >> Yeah. It's nothing
>> pass fast. Yeah. Okay. Um but so if you could focus on the big scheme of things
um I think um the most important thing is that we the Chinese were lucky enough
although having paid a heavy price but they were lucky enough to have survived
and succeeded in a revolution that gave them a set of institutions.
>> Yep. that
ended up working for them and also allowed enough space for reform.
And we're now going we're now beginning have begun a process of
rejuvenating past traditions that within the Chinese
culture that were compromised and sacrificed through two
periods. Okay. We we we had we had two period. We had one period which was our
the the communist revolution. Okay. And and and that period we we for we had
foregone a lot of our own traditions in order to
>> just to survive. Um we were almost getting expert
exterminated by the way. Uh so we we had to uh do something drastic
and then after the revolution we had the reform period which we absorbed
these western practices like market economics. Okay.
>> Um that also in many ways are contrary to Chinese traditional values. Okay. But
we survived that too. >> Yeah.
Now we're in the process of reinccorporating
our traditional ethos back into the game.
>> Yeah. >> Um and we're I think it's just at the
beginning of that phase. Um there's a there's a uh in our own in in Chinese
political lexicon it's called the two fusions. Uh the first fusion has been
around for a long time which is you know essentially fusing socialism with with
with uh Chinese uh circumstances right with
the second fusion I think was brought forward just a few years ago is fusing
socialism and Chinese traditional values uh and we're just at the beginning of
that process. >> Wow. Now,
early '9s would have been really tough, right, for you to decide on sticking
with the gun, right? I mean, on the back of
to to what extent was the failure of Perisroka and Glasnos
>> in the Soviet Union? >> Yeah. a factor for you not to go
the Russian way in the early '9s? Or was it a lot more of the pre-existing
institutional building on the [snorts] back of this infusion that's taken place
for decades since 1949? >> Well, uh, [clears throat]
the Soviet case is an interesting one. I talked about in the first chapter or two
of of my book, >> right?
>> Uh, it turned out there was a lot of luck involved.
So it's not a chance. Okay. History is like that. History [laughter]
>> serendipity plays a part. >> Exactly. There's destiny and there's
fate. Okay. [snorts] Destiny is necessity. You know, inevitability. Fate
is random. >> Okay. So in in the fall of the Soviet
Union, the collap of Soviet Union, there was a there there were many elements of
fate, many elements of chance involved. You know, if if if somebody was not away
on holiday, they had that vote and that vote, you know, maybe a certain leader
would not emerge to become the leader and and someone else would make totally
different decisions. Um and certainly I think the Soviet collapse was I think
most historians would agree that that particular collapse was in many
ways self-inflicted. Okay. um not to say they won't collapse
in the future but you know for that particular event um so so there's quite
a bit of fate in there but there were also
um deliberate decisions which is like I said they were enamored
by the material successes of the west at the time and concluded
that what led to those successes
were those political institutions and those those liberal values.
Um it turned out so I mean that's a fun that's that's like a classic mistake of
mistaking you know correlation for causality
>> and and and the Soviets they they started as you aptly pointed out
becoming a credto state. Well, that too because the,
>> you know, the Soviet Union was an incredible experiment. By the way,
>> um >> I always talk about everybody, you know,
kind of uh uh you know, talk about the Soviet
Union as as a great failure. Uh it eventually collapsed of course, but
let's not forget it was the greatest success story, one
of the amazing success story too of the 20th century. I mean if you read
>> right >> Totoy and read Dossi you know what
Russia was like >> absolutely
>> in the 19th century even as late as 19th century the uh the surf um the
backwardness all of that and the Soviet Union in one generation
turned into a modern superpower. >> Wow.
I modern in every way from science.
>> Yeah. >> To everyday life.
Uh in one generation. It was >> they were first put something on in the
orbit. >> It was a miracle almost.
>> Um you know the west industrialized and modernized over a 300 year period.
>> Yeah. >> 400 year period.
>> Wow. uh Soviet Union achieved superpower status.
Uh if you if you go to Soviet Union, you know, the first part of the the the 20th
century, you see Soviet people living totally modern lives
from what we read about Russia in the 19th
century. It was a miracle in many ways. But there there's one characteristic
about the Soviet Union was that it was a credo state.
Okay, [snorts] it was not you know the modern modernity
one big important unit in modern world is called
nation state and states based on nations.
Um and nations have a set of cultural and moral
>> right >> heritage and traditions and norms and
customs. Uh and the Soviet Union was a transnational
entity. >> Yeah.
>> And it's based it was based on socialist ideology.
So it's an ideiational ideological state. I call it a credo state.
So it doesn't matter what your cultural heritage are
cultural heritage is doesn't matter what your nationality is you got if you
subscribe to the set of ideologies then you're Soviets which was an
experiment and didn't succeed. Okay. And and I would argue that the United States
>> Yeah. >> in recent decades
>> had become a credo state. It had gone from a nation state with
fairly distinct cultural lineage
and religious and moral heritage into a liberal
credo state. And the ideology is liberalism.
>> Yeah. >> It's about essentially extreme
individualism. >> Yeah.
>> Uh so it doesn't matter what your values are, what your
traditions are, what your cultural norms are,
you subscribe to this abstract set of ideology, ideological
uh uh values, then you are America.
And I think that's a risky approach >> and and the US was not like that 100 or
200 years before. >> Of course not.
>> Yeah. >> Of course not. Um
>> the fact that it wasn't it was actually what propelled the major industrial
revolution. >> Yeah. that the industrial revolution in
the west at least uh not in China but in the west
>> right >> uh were part and parcel with a with
their cultural and and and and religious >> right
>> and moral traditions. Um
so it worked for them. Um so so I think the United States today
has become a liberal credo state. Yeah.
>> Um which are now um leading to the internal revolts
within the US and and and by the way EU is the same thing.
>> Yeah. >> European Union is essentially a credo
entity, a credo state, an ideological state.
Um, if >> what do you think could have gone wrong
with the West? [snorts] As for them to become much more of a
credo state, Europe and the US, what could have gone
wrong? >> What do you think would have made it go
wrong? Um I I think
um western modernity was a package.
>> Yeah. >> Okay. It had many elements to it. If you
you know any freshman textbook on western civ
and those books are banned by the way now [laughter]
when I was going to school in America I read them and [snorts] then and then it
became politically incorrect I think so you don't do western civ anymore I think
I think in America most universities had ditched the core curriculum except very
few like Colombia or something but Um so so you don't read these things anymore
in American universities. I read them >> um because I went there before this
happened. Um so any freshman year western civ textbook will tell you that
the the western the mainstream western civilization that led to
industrialization were of course the classics the Greeks
and the Romans. Christianity
extraordinarily important. Okay. Um um and at the time they call barbarians
which is basically Germanic tribes. Okay. So so so religious tradition was a
major part >> right
>> of western modernity. I mean the United States was built on
Puritans that moved from Europe to to US. So it's
was it was about religion or about values and and Christianity of course is
about community of course in that package there was
individualism okay the the worth of the individual was always part of the
western modernity but it was not the only thing
traditional and religious values and community were always major components
of western modernity. Yeah, >> western both traditional societies and
modern societies >> the communal element is thick.
>> But then >> this one strand because of liberalism
this one strand of the western modern package overtook the rest of it.
It's a viralent strand that somehow just metastasized
like a cancer and it's now
all-encompassing in western societies. It's all about the
individual. It's so much about the individual. It's
it's gone totally woke big time.
woke is the end result of extreme individualism.
Yeah. Identity politics also I mean some people say you know identity politics is
against the individual because they group them together. No
identity politics is about the the the goal of identity politics is to
maximally empower the individual. Yeah. >> In order to maximally empower the
individual, you you have to uh um somehow recognize the group. It so so
the group politics in whether it's ethnic groups or whatever uh uh in
western societies, it's not about the group, it's about the individual in that
group. Um whether it's a group based on race or
based on sexual orientation. >> Yeah. or based on gender.
Um, it's it's all about the the the the maximal amplification
of the individual. You you made reference to
something to the following in the book. The atomized individual
with divinely endowed rights corrots a community
>> and the creation of the Frankensteines, >> right,
>> of capital. That's right. >> Especially if they're concentrated in
certain oligarchs, right, at the expense of the majority. That's
>> right. >> Now, would could you or could we argue
that [snorts] economic inequalities
structurally I think drove woke liberalism?
>> Well, they they go hand in hand. They drive each other,
>> right? um the loss of community
and the maximal expansion and application of the individual
>> lead to basically rules of the jungle. >> Yeah.
>> So those who win win big and they keep winning. I mean it's fundament basic
economics right? If you get bigger and bigger you become monopoly. the monopoly
gets extremely competitive because the of the size. Uh so so those individuals
become oligarchs. The rest of the people because they had lost their community
don't have the power to respond. >> Yeah.
>> Cuz they have no community. They're all alienated individuals.
They're they're they're outcasts out there. They're disorganized.
Um, so that I think that's where that's the conditions of the west today.
>> Well, you you finally mentioned that you know, Wall Street and Silicon Valley,
they don't employ any more than 2 million people, but they seem to
control, >> including their nannies
>> and waitresses. >> Yeah, [laughter] exactly.
>> And they control pretty much. And and and this is what often times gets
described as as a plutoaucracy, right? >> We don't see that in China.
>> No. I mean policy makers are way above capital. You know
capital is subservient to political authority in China of course. Um because
China is fundamentally a collective society. Um so but I think things are
changing in America. >> Yeah.
>> In many parts of Europe where people are saying no to that. Um, I think part of
the MAGA movement >> is driven by that.
>> Yeah. >> Um, where it's headed, we don't know
yet. We'll have to see. We're still at early stage.
>> The rhetoric seems to resonate to the earlier, you know, Puritanism,
you know, >> or or at least
at least a desire to recapture a sense of community,
>> correct? to rejuvenate collective values that have roots
and customs and norms that have roots instead of totally uprooted individuals.
>> Yeah. So we've talked about revolution, we've
talked about infusion which has resulted in tremendous institutional building in
China. Right? The next phase is really consolidation, right? Which which really
is underpinned by three pillars, right? The anti-corruption drive,
friendliness towards the environment and reduction of inequalities and and it
just intuitively seems to me as a great foundation [clears throat]
for China to help globalize particularly to the global south. Talk about that.
>> Um, China is a developing country of course. Um and also um China's future
development depends on continued interconnectedness
with the rest of the world. Okay. So, so there basically two things are happening
two trends in the world that are happening today. Okay. I call it
deglobalization and reglobalization.
Okay. So decolonalization was essent is mostly driven by the US-led western camp
um for their own reasons. I'm not judging them here. Um I think you know
the west the US and the west made many strategic mistakes during globalization.
uh that uh all of the fruits of globalization, all of the rewards went
to very few people and [snorts] their interests are not within
are not in line with their own people anymore with not with their nations.
That's how they de-industrialized, you know. Um so so now they're going through
political changes trying to correct that. [snorts] And unfortunately,
one way to correct that as they see it is to del deglobalize
Um so that's happening. Okay. But the other trend is I think the the the
biggest um growing the lot the most significant
um country that's growing is China of course
>> and China's continued growth like I said depends on interconnectedness because
you know we're the biggest trading nation in the world and biggest trading
nation in the history of mankind and no one traded No country traded more
than China is trading today. Okay. [laughter]
[snorts] And um and and and
>> I think there's only one country in the world that doesn't have China as its
largest trading partner >> or something like that.
>> It's Bhutan. [laughter] >> But you've covered the other 193. Okay.
So, so needless to say, we we in order to continue to prosper, we need to keep
that going. Uh but the west is is retreating for
their own reasons. Nothing is wrong for them. Okay.
>> Um so they're doing their thing and we're at a different stage. We we're we
have different conditions, right? I always joke. I say, "Look, look, you
know, America could [snorts] do just fine without the rest of the world. They
got two big oceans on [clears throat] both sides of their
country. Nobody could ever invade them. It's too hard. Uh and they got so many
natural resources, right? And if they really, you know, get Canada and
Greenland Greenland as they say they want, that's enough natural resources
for 500 years. Okay. And then they got, you know,
Mexico where they could re, you know, work to re-industrial, help
re-industrialize North America maybe. And and then there's Latin America. I
mean, they got so much going. They don't need that. They don't need
interconnectedness as we do. [snorts] We don't we China doesn't have as nearly as
many natural resources. Okay? We have to trade and we're a manufacturing power.
So we have to make things and trade with the rest of the world. Um so so the
second trend is I call reglobalization where China is the main proponent one of
the main drivers and where are they going to drive this? Of course only with
the global south mainly with the global south because like I said the west is
retreating. So, so we China must find ways to
reglobalize to continue interconnectedness with the entire
global south in mutually beneficial ways and that's the only way to go otherwise
why would people trade with um so the the US government under Donald Trump
came out with a new national security document some weeks ago.
it it makes specific mentions of certain things. One of which is reestablishing
strategic stability with Russia and the other obviously
is making reference to the Monroe Doctrine,
right? And this this ties into what you've just said, Canada
all the way down to the very end of South America, right?
What are the implications to Europe, China, and the global south?
>> I mean, I I [gasps and sighs] I'm not I don't want to I'm I'm not in the place
to make judgment on the moral doctrine and and where where the US wants to do.
Um I could see why. Um because simple accounting as I just
expressed >> 500 years of
>> natural resource everything you know >> uh I would hope that they wouldn't do it
in such a crude way like the Monroe doctrine.
>> Um but it's really their strategic imperative. Okay. And I
think we could understand where that's coming from. Um I I I I
don't think it's smart for them to do it aggressively like what they're doing in
Latin America. Okay. But it's really it's up to them. It's it's their their
their thing. Okay. Um the implication of it I think is that
uh [snorts] it doesn't pay for them
to keep maintaining this global empire that they built post cold
war. It's not a good deal right to them. Uh
it's not a good deal to America. It's not a good deal to the American people.
You know, I've always said that the the American empire was built at the expense
of the American nation. Okay. The way they built this global
system is that, you know, the people at the very top.
>> Yeah. >> Okay. Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and
Hollywood. >> Yeah.
>> The Holy Trinity made
almost all the money. Okay. and and the rest lost their social
safety net. >> Yeah.
>> Lost their community, lost their good paying manufacturing jobs
>> while piling up $ 38 trillion worth of debt.
>> Lost their local church. >> Yeah.
>> Lost their religion. Lost their morality.
Wow. >> To woke.
Okay. So, so that's uh I mean
I can understand why the American people or at least a a large segments large
segments of the American population are saying no no no we we we don't want to
maintain this global empire for the benefits of these few people.
We want our communities back. We want our industry back. We want our values
back. Um, so I see that and and I think we should understand that and the
implication of it. I I believe I I think that that that this this national
security document um is not a random thing. It didn't just come out of blue.
I think the undercurrents the forces that
>> has been visible for some time >> for many many years for at least a
decade. >> Yeah.
>> Um and I think it will continue regardless with what h what what
political leaders they produce. Um so so I think what the rest of the world means
to the rest of the world is that I I think this this America le global sort
of system global empire is going to retreat much faster than people think.
Um and and of course that carries significant implications.
Um, and you know to the global south. >> If if the US were to seriously
reestablish strategic stability with Russia, intuitively
Europe [snorts] would just have to look at China more
favorably. Do you see that as a collective or more individual type of
posturing? >> I don't know. I mean I think you know we
trade China trades with many European countries
uh in a big way. >> I mean our our economic relationship
with Germany was >> enormous.
>> Yep. >> Okay. We got German companies all the
big companies in China. All I mean >> Audi's Volkswagen
you know making electric cars in China. Um and so so we we have deeply
intertwined economic and other relations with
European countries. Um and of course we now have the
uh difficult situation. Yep. in Europe and with the military
conflicts um that
had complex reasons and complex rules roots
um and if the if the US is less inclined
now than before to to be,
let's say, an active actor in those conflicts,
uh, for for their own good, >> right,
>> for America's own interests. Um, then I think everybody needs to recalculate.
Um and certainly I think European countries have much to gain by
increasing and improving interconnectedness with China.
Uh uh it's unfortunate I read you know
some in Europe are so afraid of for economic reasons that that they
they're not giving up. They're not ditching their climate goals because
they're afraid of Chinese EVs. It's unbelievable.
>> Oh my god. I mean that was like last time I read the FT that was their
religion you know energy transformation energy
transition to address climate change was Brussels religion that was that's that
was as politically correct as it gets. >> Yeah. Actually, an argument could be
made for the decline of Germany's competitiveness
or manufacturing competitiveness would have been by way of
some element of you know embracing climate change narrative as a religion.
What I would say to many European countries and Europe and and the US
included is when things are not working out for you, don't just blame other
people. >> Yeah.
>> Look at the kind of reforms that you could do.
>> Yeah. >> Okay. You know, at the end of the
cultural revolution, we had a lot of troubles.
You know, we didn't say, "Oh, it was the US's fault that our planned economy
didn't work out." >> Yeah.
>> You know, only if they could do plan economy, too, and get on a level playing
field, we do better than them. Yeah. >> So, we need to resist them. No, we said,
"Okay, parts of our parts of our political uh economic system are not
working, so we need to reform and actually learn from what working
elsewhere. and and we did import many aspects of
market economics from the west and we competed on that.
So, [laughter]
right I I want to drill down on this
institutional building. Right. you you've you've mentioned to me in the
past about
the 15-year plan, >> right, [clears throat]
>> that was announced in the early 50s, right? And for a little bit, it was
displaced by the great leap. Then it reverted back, right?
>> And then I want to tie this to what you had alluded to in the book called
Shidafu, >> right? I mean, it's it's really
technocratization, >> right? It's more meritocracy.
technocratization >> with ideals.
>> Yeah, talk about that. >> Um, well, the tradition has been with us
for 2,000 years, really since Confucious.
>> Yeah. >> It's about
common people. So, we we we did away with aristocracy
many many centuries ago, millenniums ago. Okay.
um gradually of course but but fundamentally we [snorts] um we did away
with uh uh landed aristocracy. Uh when when Chinuangi
unified China, we began to to ditch that and
>> right established a uh uh what what some political scientists
called modern state at that time. Of course, but it wasn't wasn't modern yet.
uh but that possessed many elements of a modern state. Um and and then then of
course one core element of that state is a creed
is a group of pe is is the belief that commoners through learning
you could go from nobody to
sky's is the limit except for the emperor.
Um but you the learning had the purpose. It's not technocratic just technocratic
learning learning had a purpose of serving
>> right >> the civilization
serving the state serving the collective and to to serve the values
that undergard the collective and of course at the time was confusion values.
Okay. Um so that ethos I think continues to this day.
Um and and continues through the revolution too. The revolutionaries were
saddafos because they cared about the country
the and they all they they were mostly all common people.
>> Yeah. >> I mean in Europe you know up until maybe
Napoleon a couple hundred 300 years ago only aristocrats could go to war. It was
a privilege to go to war, [snorts] right? Peasants are not good enough to
go to war. The the 15-year plans.
>> Yeah. >> I mean, you know, Mao had already this
vision that, you know, within 75 years, China could overtake the US, right? I
mean, >> he he said that at [laughter] the at the
announcement of the of the first five-year plan, it was crazy. It was um
he we're now starting the 15th correct five-year plan and he wrote
something to the effect that hey you know we're starting our first 5-year
plan. Let's work hard and and look our goal is not to mess around and just just
put food on the table. Our goal is to catch up and surpass at the time the
most advanced country in the world the United States. He says how many years is
it going to take? 5 10 20 you're probably too soon that's too optimistic
he said I don't know he said maybe maybe 75 years how about that that's just 15
five year plans he actually wrote that at that time it
was 1950 he was pretty preient
[laughter] you know I mean you're you're up there now you know when it comes to a
bunch of stuff >> for sure
>> we're now >> AI pretty soon We're embarking on the
15th 5-year plan and I'll tell you what's happening in China. Okay. Uh
amazing stuff. Okay. We are so so
we began to engage in globalization 30 some years ago, right? And it of course
began to uh it it it we joined the WTO in in 2000. Um and the way we engaged
globalization at the time was through manufacturing.
uh because that's our strength at the time and we went from single digit share
of the global industrial capacity to today our industrial capacity is the
biggest in the world bigger than the US Germany Japan India and the next five
six countries put together okay enormous 35% of the industrial output I think
going up maybe to 40% more >> yeah okay [snorts]
um and so So we kind of cleaned up industrial capacity our manufacturing
and very successful. Okay. Um but at that time 2000 plus minus uh we weren't
in the room in terms of science and technology
>> right >> okay and the US was indist indisputably
the leader so we just followed Silicon Valley. Okay. Whatever they did, we we
we followed and we seeded enormous territories like semiconductor.
Okay. Um [snorts] and and they were leading the way. Okay.
But we didn't just
lay flat like the you the the current popular Chinese term is you know
tamping. We didn't lay flat. They they worked very hard on education
on science and technology infrastructure all that. So it accumulated over decades
and we are now at the cusp of major science and technology
breakouts and breakthroughs across multiple sectors. And I predict we're
going to have 5 10 15 deepseks in different sectors in the next generation
10 years. nonlinear >> nonlinear nonlinear okay I I'll just
give you an example okay I I I would say that this process began in 2020
okay and the first sector that it affected was renewable energy
>> okay and in 2020 to 2025 today in those five years not just solar and wind and
all of that the Chinese were very successful globally also in automobiles
and and and let me kind of explain how how big that is. Okay, the auto industry
is a pillar industry of the world. Okay, a pillar industry. Okay, and post World
War II, it took three countries >> 75 years to dominate that pillar
industry. Okay, Germany, Japan, and the US. And in five years, we uprooted the
entire thing. >> Yeah.
>> And it's never going back. >> Hands down.
>> Okay. Five years compared with 75 years in a pillar industry in the world. Okay.
That's auto. Okay. So from 20 right now 2025 to 2030 in the next three year uh
five years I would say it's going to happen same thing is going to happen in
three industries. Okay.
biotech which is already happening AI and robotics
or advanced manufacturing let's say not just robotics alone okay in biotech and
I began to invest in biotech 7 8 years ago never in my wildest dream did I
anticipate [laughter] the current in situation I
mean China is quickly becoming a biotech superpower okay 70 years ago our share
of the global novel medicine patents was maybe low teens
11 12% 14%. Today is 44%. We'll go up to 50% very soon. Okay. Of
all the clinical trials that are taking place globally our share is 35% maybe
and and going up. That's bigger than the US Europe put together. Okay. The entire
world is here in China shopping for novel medicines.
I always said that, you know, in the year 2000, if you want to get a picture
of globalization, you go to Guangjo to the Canton Fair, right? Everybody in the
world is in Canton Fair. If you own a little gift shop in Seattle or you own a
uh whatever um factory in in Barcelona, you're there buying whatever you need
for your home markets. Today there's a canton fair happening in China on
biotech. Okay. All these companies are
entertaining potential customers from America, Europe, Russia, and you name
it. [snorts] Buying novel medicines IPS from China. Okay. And that's happening
already. So in next 5 years I think it will continue. Okay. Second AI. AI of
course everybody's saying US and China commit. Of course there's competition
but China takes a totally different approach and it it's very relevant to
the global south. Let me explain. >> Um so we take an open source approach.
Okay. US takes the closed source approach. It also has to do with
political system and political DNA. Okay. Will take hours to explain this
but let me just I'm with you. >> So the US US approach is essentially
invest innovate and see grants.
>> Correct. Okay, like all these companies, all these big techs, we've been paying
them rents for the last 20 years. You know that. Okay. Um the Chinese approach
is different. It's invest, innovate, and compete and scale up and make things
affordable that everybody gets it. Okay. Like like
what we did with manufacturing. Okay. How come, you know, how come
everybody in America, I mean, you think all these Americans and Europeans could
afford to buy these Christmas toys 30 years ago without China? No,
>> dude. You go to Amazon, you go to Walmart, 99% of the goods are made in
China. >> Make it affordable. Of course, that has
an issue. There is an issue. I understand where, you know, I think
President Trump said, you know, maybe too many dollars is not a good thing.
Maybe two is enough. Maybe he's right. I'm not judging that, okay? I'm just
saying we make things massive scale and affordable and same thing's happening in
AI, okay? I mean, I know there the US is stronger on on computing power because
the chips um but it doesn't it's not that's not where it's at, I think. Okay,
we where I know companies around the world including major American companies
are kind of secretly they're not advertising they're using Chinese AI
[laughter] because they're using Q1 they're using you know Kimmy whatever it
is I mean because look the Chinese AI companies are selling [snorts] a million
tokens for 38 cents US >> disproportionately cheaper
>> okay GPT I think sells them for $5.5 US. I mean, that's so big. The the
difference is so big. Okay, I tell you, you know, without Chinese AI,
global south and AI will never meet. They will have nothing to do with each
other other than the global south paying rents
to American AI companies like they've been paying rents to Apple and Google
and everyone else. all the big tax. Okay. But Chinese AI open source,
they are affordable. If you're an Indonesian company, you
want to use AI 38 cents, maybe going down to 25 cents a million tokens, you
can actually use them as a tool to help your business.
It's actually affordable. You're not paying rents. Okay. So, so I
think um AI very important. [clears throat] uh I especially in the
global south it may even be in America but especially in global south um and
the third is uh advanced manufacturing robotics I mean that's already happened
so that's the next 5 years 19 uh 2025 to 2030 and look beyond 2030 to 2035
>> oh my god >> I see future you know I can name to
quantum and nuclear fusion I see >> well you've already announced a thorium
>> right nuclear >> but still early I see tremendous mendous
amount of capital, human resources, government policies going into these
sectors and I think will bear fruits 5 years from now. [snorts] So we will be
China will be at the forefront of science and technology across the
board two that
>> will be [clears throat] made to be shared with the global south.
>> Think about that. two two fundamental observations that
just keep on staring at me. The first is the US economy is just too bloated.
You know, you you take a DD qua ride in Chenzen, there's no tipping,
>> right? >> And on a per mile cost, it's cheaper.
and the marginal productivity for China. I
mean, you you can get a an Apple Watch equivalent in Shenzhen for $12.
It functions. It looks just as good when you're paying about $450 in Palo Alto
for an Apple Watch. I mean,
you know, for somebody in Africa, somebody in Papua, somebody in any
village in the global south, those are just going to resonate, right? That's
right. >> The way you open source everything.
So, what could stop this? I mean, well, let me let me also share that you
produce 4 to 4.5 million stem products per year. Southeast Asia only 750,000 of
which Indonesia 250,000. the US only 800,000 STEM products per year.
Your your marginal productivity is only going to keep going up and beating the
rest. Unstoppable. Right. [snorts] So your
your I think your struggle is the degree to which you can democratize capital to
the global south. >> Yeah. Would would you agree with that? I
I so so if you go to China the buzz word today is called chuhai.
Chuhai means literally means going overseas. Okay. But but what it means
are or Chinese companies mostly technology companies. I mean
manufacturing companies too but but manufacturing companies with heavy
technology uh content uh going to globalize going overseas. Um, and a lot
of these companies including EV companies, I mean I think BYD
manufacturing in Brazil, in Thailand, in in in Hungary, Indonesia,
>> Indonesia, Chinese drone company, robotics companies um so all these
battery companies um all these companies are
>> CL is opening. >> That's right. That's right. Um so so I
would say that look I say I just throw this out for for I mean I
really haven't thought this through so I could be wrong. Okay. Um I I think the
first phase of globalization which is ending
has three main drivers. Okay. American capital and technology
Chinese production and global market. Yeah, I think the next phase of
globalization will also have three drivers as Chinese capital and
technology, world production and global market.
M >> and and the Chinese have to spread their
production and spread their their industrial and technological footprint
and around the world especially in the global south and the the challenge is
how to make it mutually beneficial. how to bring up the development of the
entire global south uh uh with that and I think um the the political desire is
there. >> Yeah.
>> The geopolitical [snorts] necessities also there
um and the commercial incentives are there too as well.
>> Yes. You know, I tell I tell my Western friends, you know, they keep thinking
that the reason why BYD is building factories in Thailand and Indonesia
would be that >> it's geopolitical.
>> And I tell them it's not geopolitical. It's pure economics,
>> right? >> You know, they got to compete with 98
other EV makers in China, whereas in Southeast Asia, [laughter]
they're the only boy in town. >> They're going to make more money in
Southeast Asia. But but I I think the long game as it relates to the global
south or call it Southeast Asia [snorts] is
technological transfer. >> Yeah.
>> Right. And and if if we take a look at the FDR that comes to Southeast Asia, it
takes place at a rate of about 200 to 230 billion a year.
>> Of which Singapore gets about 100 to 140.
>> Indonesia gets about 30 to 40. Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam each gets
about 10 to 20. But the structural limitation in capital allocation relates
to I think rule of law.
>> Yeah. >> And translational wherewithal. So if we
want to see China help with reglobalization,
I think China could take a view on how rule of law could get better in the
destination countries and how the translational wherewithalss,
>> the translational wherewithal is really correlated with the number of people
they get educated in STEM, >> right? Whether you bring in Chinese
professors to Southeast Asia or we send a bunch of Southeast Asians to the
Chinua of the world, >> right? And my idea is that I think
Chinese I think Chinese universities at the first rate. Okay. [snorts] Uh and
there are many of them. [laughter] I got number two. Um and they're
particularly good particularly good at STEM.
>> Yeah. Um so I think our top 50 universities
should I think the government should encourage them go around the world and
set up campuses STEM campuses. >> Yeah. Yeah, you don't have to, you know,
include philosophy or but STEM campuses uh in different subjects
>> are partnering with the best educational institutions locally uh to train
people to train young people in the global south and have them come to China
uh uh and and go back and forth uh and that I then we build a network
>> Yeah. >> uh of people uh and talents. Um I I mean
I I think that many of them are doing it. Yeah. I see some of the best
universities working on setting up campuses overseas mostly in the global.
>> Not enough. >> Yeah. Not enough.
>> I think it needs I agree. >> Needs to scale and and and the beauty
about the educational system in China is that you can be pretty indiscriminate
about it because you you don't gain the system there. you can send your kid to
Chungtu, Chongqing, Dalian, Shanghai, Beijing, you get pretty much the same
quality education. Whereas in other countries, you got to be rich to be able
to get your son or daughter to get a better education, right? Because you can
game the system. that that I think is is going to bode well for the look my
thesis for Southeast Asia is to look to China increasingly more for
technological capital allocation and to the west for economic capital because
they've been printing a lot of money >> right
>> right but that money is not coming to Southeast Asia because of their
perception of perhaps lack of rule of law lack of translational wherewithal
that that I think could be the recipe for reglobalization as you aptly pointed
out and and we have who uh like China and the global south and
other countries and China's a main part of global south China and other
countries of the global south need to work together to establish
rules and standards that are conducive to our
common development. Okay. That work for us.
>> Yeah. you know, not the so-called rule of law that doesn't work for us, that's
imposed on us. Okay. Um, so, so that's why a lot of the, you know, a lot of the
so-called rule of laws or other political institutions, you know,
they used to they used to say that for many decades, they used to say that, you
know, if you just [snorts] if you just did this in Indonesia, you you'll get
rid of corruption. and they did all the corruption got worse there many many
studies okay um so so that that's I think you know China uh at that level
has something to contribute as well because China had the experience of
building institutions that work for them not perfect case study there are many
flaws many problems I mean China has a corruption problem too um but they're
cracking down they've been cracking down um But China does have the experience of
have building institutions that more or less work for them and continue to
reform reform them. >> I want to go back to
climate change. >> Yeah.
>> If if you charge your Tesla in PaloAlto, it'll charge you about 48 to 55 cents
per kilowatt hour. But >> you charge your Xiaomi or BYD and shenan
it's only four to 5 cents per load per capita. [laughter]
So I mean I I I can only deduce that it's because of the massive supply chain
capabilities. Right? So I I don't think that's easily replicated onto the global
south. But I think what works is the political economy argument.
>> Right? I think capital allocation from China will take place in the global
south if China understands a little bit better about the political economy
argument right I would argue that if China does enough to educate the glo the
global south whether it's STEM or others particularly STEM [snorts] if the EV in
a global south gets charged at a cost of seven cents
>> not necessarily five because of the lack of supply chain Yeah,
>> they will still pay. >> Of course.
>> You know what I mean? [laughter] >> I I I read I mean for Indonesia, you
know, I read that Indonesia has the on its agenda energy transition.
>> Energy transition. Okay. >> Um
for a country of this size, of so many islands, I mean, okay, it's
an amazing country. I look at the map. I'm like, wow, Indonesia. Okay. I I was
I came to see you. So I looked at the map. Okay. [laughter]
I mean for a country like Indonesia with this kind of population
energy transition I mean come on. You got to have I mean China is the only
Allow me to say this. I'm not saying it in a in a in any
in an arrogant way or anything like that. Okay. I say in the most humble
way. China is your only viable partner. [snorts] China is the only country that
could produce the hardware, the equipment, the infrastructure at
affordable costs, >> right?
And scale them up, okay? And and can execute on a timely
basis. And they they're they're fast. [laughter]
Um so so so we I mean you you need to partner
with the Chinese. >> Yeah.
>> Figure out a way >> particularly for technological capital
>> and and the and the and the Chinese China is is
just by sheer size is is a big presence everywhere. I know sometimes that could
appear uh threatening. >> Yeah.
>> Uh but it's a soft one. >> Yeah.
>> Okay. I mean think about it. I mean, you don't believe these people will tell you
the Chinese are big, that's why they're threat. The Chinese never go around the
world telling them how to run their countries. Never. Never.
>> Yeah. >> Okay. So,
>> just just by that alone, >> we're not discounting Western
technology, >> right?
>> I'm only making the point that Western technology might be more 0ero to one,
but it's just not as affordable as Chinese technology. And and I do believe
China in the near foreseeable future will be able to do more zero to one
>> of course tech we're doing zero.
>> Yeah. >> Um
>> and it's it's a lot more affordable for people in Africa, Southeast Asia and the
de you know the global south. No, I I think you know for medicine you know
biotech I mean in the last decades a western companies dominated
medicine and it's not cheap some countries have just have to ditch IP and
just do generics but we're not doing that okay so so I with the current
trajectory persists I think in five years China Chinese affordable Chinese
novel medicines are going to spread around the world.
>> Yeah. >> To the benefit of hundreds of millions
of people. >> Yeah. Do do you see this as an incentive
for the West to reduce the bloat?
>> The West [clears throat] has its own myriad complex
issues to deal with. >> Yeah. They are deeply rooted issues
and we're not in the position to make judgments
on them. Okay? They must make tough choices
and and like any tough choices, China made tough choices over decades um that
>> you know sacrifice certain interests for others, right? The West is having to do
that, I think. And we have no idea how they but it's it's their decisions to
make. It's their decisions to make. Um, so, you know, we're we're sort of like
living in a much more structured multipolarity now.
>> Yeah. >> And and revisionism is inevitable.
Coming from countries that used to be really tiny, now they've gotten much
larger. >> Yeah. And I think it's high time and and
I I sense that Southeast Asia is one of the very few that can actually toggle
between China and the West because of scale and I think geopolitical and
geostrategic relevance. Would would you
agree with that? >> I think it's possible. Um I I happen to
think that uh if the current trend continues, China
will be able to deal with America directly very well.
Um, you know, I think America's is possibly the United States is on a
trajectory of um acting in its own best collective interests
instead of the interests of the liberal elites at the expense of national
interests to maintain this global uh hgeimon
status. Um so if that's that trend continues
um I I think China and the United States will be able to
of course they will compete uh but I think they will be able to avoid harmful
conflicts and act in their own respective best interests.
>> Eric, I want to ask you two more questions.
the the national security
narrative for Indonesia is underpinned by essentially food
security and energy security, right? You you as a capital allocator, what would
you advocate for for Indonesia? I would add advocate like I said partnering with
China on energy transition >> so you have affordable
scalable and executable infrastructure built for renewables that
you can chart your own course on energy okay China's charting it own course on
energy you can chart your own course energy in the long term okay it's it
take time but yeah >> okay second um agriculture I mean That's
Indonesia is a major agricultural country. It's it's your pillar industry.
>> Um and and agriculture also had a lot to do with social fabric. Um and it's how
you incorporate techn I mean China is also
at the forefront of agricultural technologies. You know for instance
robotic and drones okay you know I have a drone company. We have a drone
company. It's one of the largest agricultural drones in the world and we
[snorts] manage huge farmlands with no human being. Maybe one. Okay. Um
and and >> smoking cigarette looking at the screen
>> and we're active in Thailand, active in Brazil, you know, all these agricultural
countries. Um and robotics on the ground, cotton fields, robots picking
them. Um so but how you incorporate with technologies in a way
that's that helps you improve productivity but
also doesn't hurt your social cohesion and the benefits are shared.
Uh that's what Indonesia needs to really consider. But technologies are there.
China has them affordably again.
Wow. You know, Southeast Asia has about 5 to 6 million hectares of mangroves,
>> right? >> Mangroves, I think, is one of the more
undernarrated decarbonizing narratives.
>> Cuz you know, with with one hectar, you can sequester about a
>> they suck up they suck up >> a ton of carbon, right? So, just imagine
if Southeast Asia could plant up to 10 million hectares.
>> It's amazing. this region could suck up could sequester a quarter of humanity's
carbon emission which is about 40 gigatons. So that's 10 gigatons and and
I I think drones could play the role of planting because the productivity is
orders of magnitude more than just a fisherman planting one by one right you
can just shoot it down and then plant. Yeah, absolutely.
That is what the Chinese and the Chinese leader
called a shared destiny, >> right?
>> Think about that. Mangroves >> of this size suck up
>> amazing >> carbon emission.
China is a major manufacturing power. >> You know, building nuclear reactor takes
years, right? But planting mangro >> with the with the help of drones it's
instantaneous and you can sequester within couple of years or whatever.
>> Last question. [laughter] It's it's it's about an hour and a half
already. What what do you think would slow down China's engine?
>> I mean, you know, about all the great >> two risks.
>> Yeah. >> Um one is we have a demographic
challenge in the horizon. uh it's it's not immediate but it's in
the horizon um and I hope we address that um um you know in sometime in the
distant in the future that we have a lot of retirees and fewer young people
working that's always a problem okay it's not the total population problem is
the structure of the population um we need to we're we are addressing it uh in
in through technological ical means. Of course, all the robots got to make them
work, right? Um, but we may also need to address that through
policies, >> right?
>> And and social policies and education and values. Um, so so that's something I
think we need to address. It's a risk. Second risk of course is that in this
emerging multipolar world there are a lot of uncertainties, a lot of
geopolitical tensions. Uh is that we somehow
get dragged into some kind of unwanted military conflict. Uh I think the
Chinese don't want that. Um but there are many other forces in play.
>> Yeah. >> Um so we need to really act be extra
careful about that. >> Anything [clears throat] we might have
missed? >> No. I think [laughter]
this is >> that was that was pretty exhaustive.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Great. >> Thank you so much, man.
>> Thank you so much. We'll have we need a beer.
>> Yes. [laughter] >> All right.
>> Thanks, >> friends. That was Eric Lee, chairman of
Changi Capital from China. [music] Thank you.
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